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The Eminence of Social Justice in Plato
RICHARD D. MOHR
In this paper I wish to chip away at one of the major received opinions in
Platonic scholarship.' The orthodoxy which I wish to challenge is that in
the Republic Plato takes individual or personal justice—the diverse but
integrated workings of the parts of the soul—as primary justice or justice
pure and simple and takes social justice—an individual's fulfilling his
distinctive function in the social division of labor—as a secondary and
derivative notion. I shall argue to the contrary that social justice rather than
individual justice turns out to be the architectonic principle of the two kinds
of justice. A great deal turns on this issue.
For if I am right then Plato is not foreshadowing Aristotle and the
whole tradition of agent-oriented ethical theorists, who claim that good
actions are to be understood as those which would be performed by the good
person—whose goodness must be capable of being defined independently of
the acts which he performs. For Plato, the parts-of-the-soul doctrine and in
particular justice viewed as psychic harmony is supposed, on this reading, to
provide the requisite independent means of assessing the goodness of an
agent and so derivatively of his acts.
The view that Plato is such an agent-oriented theorist was first clearly
articulated in the closing speculative paragraph of David Sachs' well-known
article, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic":
I believe it likely that Plato held that there are allowable exceptions to
every moral rule, or virtually every moral rule, of conduct . . . [For
Plato,] rules of conduct do not constitute anything essential to
morality or justice. This, I believe, was one of the principal motives
for his characterization of justice, a characterization not in terms of
conduct and relations of persons, but in terms of the relation of parts of
the soul.^
^ The paper was read at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division
meetings March 1985 in San Francisco. It is a companion piece to "A Platonic
Happiness," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987) 131-45.
' D. Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic" in G. Vlastos (ed.). Plato I (Garden City. NJ
1971) 50-51. That a philosopher recognizes exceptions to important moral rules, of
course, need not propel him into acceptance of an agent-centered theory. All the
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This view has been advanced more recently in the writings of Julia
Annas.^ I shall argue to the contrary that Plato advances an act-oriented
ethical theory, in which the goodness of an action is determined
independently of the motives, intentions, or even virtues of its agent. I
shall advance this view in two ways. First, 1 will show that Plato's
analogy between the parts of the city and the parts of the soul leads to
irresolvable paradox if individual justice is taken as primary justice, paradox
that can be handsomely resolved if social justice is taken as paramount.
Second, I argue that the alleged proof text of the orthodox
—
Republic 4,
443c^4a—does not require the interpretation it has traditionally been
assigned.
The orthodox view that the just society consists of individuals all with
similarly diversified and integrated souls places Plato in serious difficulty.
For Plato has a problem if he both wishes to claim that everyone in the
Platonically just state has some one social function which is accounted for
by the type of soul which the individual has and also wishes to claim that
everyone in the Platonically just state is just in such a way that all three
parts of the soul of each individual are diversified and integrated in the same
way from individual to individual. If Plato is claiming that the state is just
and integrated and that the individual is just and integrated in both cases as
being a harmony of diverse parts, he backs himself into the paradox that the
state will be just only if the individuals are not (for social distinctness
demands distinctiveness of psychic kinds) and all the citizens will be just
only when the state is not (for if every soul has the same kind of parts in
the same relations, so as to be balanced, there will be in the state no
division of labor based on diverse soul-types)."*
philosopher need do is to recognize some hierarchy of rules and principles. The structure
of principles would then explain when one rule overrides or trumps another, thus
incorporating exceptions to lower-ranking rules into a system of morality. The central
books of the Republic and the discussion of the Form of the good clearly show that Plato
thought ethical principles form a hierarchy. Further, he clearly thought he could
incorporate into a system of justice the exceptions which Sachs has centrally in mind
(justified lying, and the failure to retum "owed" goods). For Plato devotes large stretches
of argument to the issue of when and to whom one may or should lie and to the issues of
proper private ownership and distributive justice.
^ J. Annas, "Plato and Common Morality," CQ 28 (1978) 437-51 and An Introduction
to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981) 157-69.
* When Plato speaks of psychic "harmony" (e.g., 443d5) he does not mean harmony in
the sense of a musical chord or arrangement of chords, rather he is referring to the tuning of
an instrument (see Plato's extended discussion of psychic harmony at Phaedo 92a-95a).
Harmonies in the former sense may, of course, be very various, but in the lauer sense there
can be but one harmony between instruments of the same type that are to play together.
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Through most of the Republic Plato studiously avoids confronting this
paradox, which results from viewing the good individual and the good state
as strictly parallel in structure.^ Even through most of Books 8 and 9, Plato
formally maintains the soul/state parallelism with the structures of unjust
individuals paralleling exactly the structures of unjust states. Finally, and
significantly, right at the end of Book 9, Plato gives us the equipment we
need to resolve the paradox.
I suggest that Plato's way out of the paradox is to hold that social
justice is the architectonic ordering principle of individual justice, that an
individual's psychic parts are distinct yet balanced only as the result of his
holding his position in the Platonically just, functionally diversified state.
The individual's internal balancing is a balancing that occurs as the result of
external forces provided from the Platonically diversified state; indeed, social
functions viewed as external forces are constitutive of the integration and
harmony of the state. The relation of individual balance and state
diversification is to be understood, I suggest, along the lines of the
following medical analogy.
Imagine an individual who is diseased, say, by leukemia or some other
similar form of cancer, in such a way that one part of the body is
manifesting an unlimited propensity to proUferate at the expense of other
essential body parts and that this is occurring because some other part of the
body, say the body's natural immune system, is underdeveloped and so is
not keeping in check the propensity of the disease-causing part to
proliferate, with the result that the totality of bodily functions is thrown
wildly out of kilter. Now, the bodily parts can be brought back into balance
by external forces, say, through injections of compensatory bodies,
irradiation, or drugs, all of which enhance or supplement the body's weak
immune system and so make the immune system effective in ways it could
not be on its own (for Plato's analogous views on bodily cures, see
Timaeus 89a-d). Thus the body could be said to come to be in balance
again, but only as the result of external forces which are able to come into
play just exactly because the external world is not homogeneous, but rather
is functionally differentiated, having ready repositories of medicine and
medical knowledge.
The paradox, then, cannot be resolved by claiming that Plato is thinking of individuals
differing as chords differ. In any case, given the components of the Platonic soul,
especially the appetites and ambition with their propensities to excess, there can be only
one right combination of them. Other combinations are not chords but discords: the
various unjust souls of Books 8-9 (e.g., 554d9).
* Bernard Williams has shown that to maintain strict soul/state parallelism Plato must
go to the extreme of performing a number of intellectual sleights of hand, "The Analogy of
City and Soul in Plato's Republic," in E. N. Lee, et al. (edd.). Exegesis and Argument,
Phronesis Suppl. 1 (Assen 1973) 196-206.
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The parts of the soul and their relation to the external world are, I
suggest, very much like this for Plato. The lowest part of the soul is an
unlimited appetite with a propensity to take over and completely disrupt the
functions of the other parts of the soul (for the appetites as boundless and
insatiable, see 442a, 555b, 562b, 586b, 590b, 604d; and as always tending
to disruption, see 577c-e, 579c-e, cf. Philebus 63d-e). The intelligence
which keeps these passions and appetites in check and so in balance is not
equally or sufficiently the possession of every man. Therefore, if every man
were to use only his own resources in balancing his soul, the Platonic state
would be impossible; rather we would have the chaotic flux of the
democratic state, in which the very possibility of diversified yet integrated
functions is destroyed (562b-64c; n.b. the disease metaphors in 563e, 564b-
c). Plato gives us the remedy for this situation as the final substantive
point which is made in the main sequence of Books (2-9). Plato claims
that in the Platonically just state the majority of citizens will be enslaved to
the wisdom of the philosopher (590c), and continues:
It is best that an individual should have divine intelligence within
himself, but if he has not, then it must be imposed from outside, so that
as far as possible we should be all alike and friendly, since governed by
the same principle. (590d3-6)
When finally here Plato briefly sketches what "rubbing together" individual
and social justice would look like—the project entertained at 434e-35a—we
find that the integration of the diversified parts of the individual soul is
dependent upon and results from the individual's position in the state's
division of labor. That all individuals are "alike," are equally, individually
just and balanced, is the result of the relations of the individual to other
parts of the state, rather than the result of the workings of the individual's
parts in themselves. Thus Plato resolves the paradox of the strict
parallelism of individual and state by claiming that the balance within the
individual is the relational result of external forces which are made possible
by individuals having different types of souls which in and of themselves
have psychic functions which are not in balance. The derivative, relational
balance of the individual occurs as the result of balanced diversity in the
state. The balanced diversity of the state is the result of the imbalance of
psychic functions in individuals. This imbalance of the individual holds
even for the philosopher, who qua philosopher no longer exercises as he did
in youth (537b, 539d) and so has an attendant atrophying of the middle part
of the soul (410b, e) requiring balancing in the state by others (519c-20c).
In this way it finally turns out that social justice is the architectonic
principle for individual justice. Parts of an individual's soul fulfill their
functions in major part because the functions are enhanced by external forces
provided from the functionally diverse state.
Usually, however, just the opposite is claimed. The critical tradition
holds that primary justice for Plato is an attribute of the relations of the
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parts of the soul and that social justice is somehow derivative upon this
personal justice. This position is generally thought to be unequivocally
stated near the close of Book 4, in a highly compressed and turbid passage,
443c-44a. I will suggest that this passage makes no such claim and is
committed to no more than the soul/state parallelism so far discussed. The
purpose of the passage, I claim, is simply to establish the surprising result
that there is a sense of justice that can be applied to an individual in
isolation. It is not the purpose of the passage, along the way, to deny that
social justice, the fulfilhng of social functions, also really is justice.^
When in the passage 443c^Wa Plato denies that justice lies in a man's
external affairs or in concerns extrinsic to his proper self (tt|v e^cd jtpa^iv
T©v amou 443c 10), he does not mean, I suggest, for social functions to
fall under the description "extrinsic concerns." Plato has just claimed that
all along he has been maintaining that fulfilling social functions is a
principle and mold of justice (dpxTiv xe Kal xvnov) and now he reaffirms
that this is in fact true (443c 1, 9). Rather, the extrinsic concerns which are
denied the status of proper loci of justice are things Uke the acquisition of
wealth, the care of the body, politics, and contract making. These are
immediately catalogued (443e3-4). The denial that these are an independent
source of moral and social concern is important. For it was these things
which formed the proper concerns of justice for all of Socrates'
interlocutors. The whole passage harks back to the long discussion earlier
in Book 4 on the status of wealth, contracts, and law at 422a-27a, where it
was also denied that these concerns constitute proper arenas of justice.
The two passages vary as follows. The later (443) claims that the
proper disposition (e^k; 443e6) of the parts of the soul is a chief and
necessary means by which we achieve what is appropriate in regard to our
extrinsic concerns. For the proper relations of soul parts, especially the
repression of the insatiable appetites, keep one from naturally running off to
excess in whatever course of action one takes with regard to money, the
body, and day-to-day relations with others. Thus, this passage bears the
burden of establishing that the Platonically just man will also be just as
that notion is commonly understood. Thus the passage continues the point
of 442e-43a: The man who has his aggressive appetites under control will
not rape, steal, or cheat. But the mere correct balance of soul parts does not
establish—how could it?—the determinately correct course of action with
regard to sexual relations, wealth, and contracts. Knowing the (often open-
ended) extremes of which we are capable, and towards which our appetites
propel us, does not tell us how we ought determinately to act in regard to
acquisitions, contracts, and other day-to-day affairs.
^ The phrase ox; aXtiSox; (443dl), which posits a personal dimension of justice, should
be seen as balancing, not superseding, the phrase to aXr\Qic, (443c9), which re-affinms
proper social functioning as justice.
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For Plato—and this is the point of the earlier passage (422-27)—our
social functions establish what our ends are to be regarding money making,
care of the body, and dealings with others, and determine what positive form
these activities are to take. In Book 5 this establishment of ends by
reference to social functions is extended even to cover familial and sexual
relations. Considerations of wealth, politics, civil law, and contracts all are
derivative from and take their proper form from the way in which they can
best serve in establishing Platonic social justice—each person's fulfilling
his proper task. How much money we have, with whom we have dealings,
and the like are all governed and molded by oiu* social tasks; our social tasks
are not governed and molded by them. This is the reason Plato wishes to
deny that justice is primarily concerned with affairs extrinsic to one's proper
self.
Now, for an individual to fulfill his social function and to order
correctly his derivative civil affairs, his soul cannot be in a chaotic state.
Further, if he is to be able to carry out his function, he must be the subject
of certain basic forms of consideration from others, or at least non-
interference in his affairs on the part of others. An individual cannot carry
out his social function in a social climate where rape, murder, cheating, and
theft are rife in the land. Therefore, if an individual is to possess a social
function, it is necessary not only that his own soul possess individual
justice but that the souls of others also possess individual justice. The parts
of everyone's soul must be distinct and must not meddle with each other and
so manifest individual justice, if social justice is to be possible throughout
the state.
The purpose of our passage (443) then is to complete the discussion
started earlier in Book 4 of the way in which the common arenas of justice
are subordinately incorporated into the Platonic state. The purpose of the
passage is not to dislodge social justice as a principle of justice but to
establish individual justice as one.
This purpose is sufficient to explain the rhetorical exuberance of the
passage. No reader uninitiated in Platonic ethics would suppose that it
makes sense to say that an individual in isolation could be just. It would
seem that unlike, say, bravery and prudence, which may be either social or
purely personal in their locus and effect, justice is a virtue which must be
social in its arena. It deals essentially with our relations with others.
Indeed it is typically taken to be synonymous with social virtue. So Plato's
claim that there is a sense in which it is appropriate to say that an individual
even by himself is just is quite revolutionary when set against the
background of common opinion. But it is revolutionary (or at least
revisionary) even set against the language of justice which Plato himself has
been developing heretofore in the Republic.
Even as late as 443b2 the phrase "the things proper to oneself (xoc
avtov) was being used, as it had been since Book 2 (370a ff.), as a stand-in
or paraphrasis for "function." The phrase describes, quite generally,
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something that a discrete, unified entity performs. Indeed, the possession
and performance of what is peculiar and proper to oneself (fj xox) oiKEio\) xe
Kttl eavTou e^k; xe Kal npa^ic;) was given as the definition of social
justice at 433el2-34al. But suddenly at the end of Book 4, this well-
established vocabulary of "things appropriate and peculiar to oneself is used
without prior warning to define not the operations of a unified self, but
(rather surprisingly) the parts of the self (xa oiKEia 443d3, certainly; xwv
ai)xo\) clO and Ea-uxov Kal xa eavxcu dl, probably)J It is therefore not
surprising that Plato draws attention to this shift in usage and claims that
the new use of the vocabulary is legitimate in the new context. He does
this by saying that the parts of the soul "really" and "truly" (xw ovxi 443d3,
ox; dJltiGccx; dl) are things proper and distinctive to an individual. But this
is not to say that all other dimensions of justice are sham, derivative, or in
some other sense less than real.^ To say that one type of thing is truly F is
not to deny that other types of things are also truly F. Further, it is
perfectly natural in ordinary discourse to use "truly" and "really" to describe
unexpected discoveries or surprising turns of events. It is in Uiis sense that
Plato's use of the terms in this passage is even to be expected, since he
describes the unanticipated discovery that there really is a sense in which an
individual thought of in isolation can be just and wishes to signal the
surprising malleability of the language of justice. But we must not mistake
the justified rhetoric^ exuberance of the passage for more than what it is.
Plato is not throwing out or even demoting his social conception of justice.
Republic 443 is not, then, the star passage for those who wish to claim that
for Plato justice per se is individual justice. But the orthodox have nowhere
else to turn in the Republic to establish their position. I suggest that they
should begin to doubt it.
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' I think it possible that these phrases at 443cl0, dl are vague in scope and are not
simply extensionally equivalent to the later expression xa ev xfj Y^xx\ yivr\, 443d3.
' When at 443c4 Plato calls social justice an "image," he is not thereby giving it a
status inferior to that of individual justice or claiming that individual justice is the original
of which social justice is an image—something he might easily have said if he were so
inclined. Rather Plato is contrasting social justice with a third sort of justice which is in
both the just man and the just state (444a4-5). The claim that the definition of social
justice is an image is simply part of the general acknowledgment throughout Books 2-4,
8-9 that the definitions of the virtues (and indeed all of these Books' substantive moral
claims) are tentative hypotheses, which in the terminology of the central Books are dream-
images of eternal certainties (533b-c). Even the doctrine of the tripartite soul is viewed as
tentative (435c-d). And at 506d the individual virtues (504a) are said to have been
discussed as the Idea of good will be, that is, through images and Ukenesses. For both
social and individual justice as tentatively understood when compared to some third more
fundamental form of justice (probably the Idea of justice is intended), see 543d-44a.

